[[alternative]]Modeling Competition Games among Air Freight Carriers by 石豐宇

































 A Game Theory Approach for the Competition Strategies among 
International Express Couriers 
?????NSC 92-2416-H-032-002 
?????92? 8? 1?? 93? 7? 31? 
???????  ?????????? 

















































In recent years, the emergence of Taiwan’s 
hi-tech industry has changed rapidly. 
Accompanying with all these changes, the 
demand of air cargo transportation is 
growing up resulted in the increasing 
concerns regarding to speed, security, and 
reliability of the delivering goods.  Due to 
the prosperousness and the numerous 
competitors of the market, air cargo carrier 
becomes one of the most competitive 
businesses in the region.  Air cargo carriers 
are all devoting themselves in working out 
measures and strategies reacting to this 
situation to maintain or to raise their market 
shares.  Among the measures been taken are: 
lowering of the freightage, increase of the 
frequency of the flights, and improvement of 
the service quality. 
As an oligopoly market, the pricing and 
service strategies of one air cargo carrier 
would affect and be affected by the strategies 
adopted by the others.  In addition, the same 
interaction also exists between cargo carrier 
and their forwarders.  Service strategies 
include the scheduling of flight frequency, 
departure and arrival time, and reliability. 
This study applies solution concepts derived 
 2
from Hansen, i.e., a non-cooperative game 
approach in an oligopoly market with 
variable O-D demands.  The demand 
function, calibrated by using SP and RP 
survey data from a stratified sampling of 
forwarders.  Logit function was used in the 
calibration of carrier’s market share model.  
The concept of Bertrand model was adopted 
in the solution of optimal freightage and 
flight schedule adjustment in Oligopolistic 
competition. 
By using the iterative feedback approach, we 
solve the problem of a non-linear 
mixed-integer system of equations that 
produces the optimal freightage and flight 
schedule adjustment of each air cargo carrier. 
In the case study, we demonstrated the air 
cargo market of Taipei to US West Coast 
served by three major cargo carriers, i.e., 
China Airlines, EVA Airways and Northwest 
Airlines, and solve for their optimal 
freightage and flight schedules.  The 
solutions derived from our case study 
provide valuable information for air cargo 
carriers in their planning of operating 
strategies. 
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